Rasul Baksh Rais

War for peace by Rasul Baksh Rais

Two things are important, not for war, but for securing peace: national reconciliation within Afghanistan by bringing the Taliban into the political process; and promoting a regional approach to settling issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between Pakistan and India

The conflict in Afghanistan is entangled in many ethnic, religious and regional issues, and is the result of three decades of war involving different actors. The only constant has been the suffering of the Afghan people.

There is a hypocritical element to this conflict and those that get sucked into it: everyone involved in the war wants to build peace through war, defeat the adversary and then create a favourable political and security environment.

This approach to peace and order in Afghanistan is based primarily on conquest, i.e. we must prevail over the enemy by using force. The assumption is that this is doable, and that morally and politically it is the correct path. The Soviets, the mujahideen, the Taliban, Northern Alliance and now US-NATO forces all entertained the same illusions.

There are two incorrect assumptions about the conflict in Afghanistan, which have been maintained for decades by security establishments and think tanks. First, that wars are necessary to defeat dangerous opposition forces, which are portrayed as inhuman. This caricature is applied to the Afghan people as a whole, too. The Afghan communists, and now the Taliban, have been given the same diabolical character. It is equally true, though, that Afghan groups have treated each other with hate and cruelty.

Second, that there is no alternative to war. In such thinking, there appears to be a cultural bias against the Afghans, i.e. that they are fighting wars, and when they are not, they are preparing for them.

The empirical evidence from Afghanistan is very different from what Afghanistan experts and pundits would like us to believe: wars have provoked more wars and made the path to peace very difficult. As a result of conflict, society has become increasingly fractured along narrow ethnic, tribal and regional lines, with many warlords emerging with their own fiefdoms. These warlords replaced the state in the provision of security and some marginal political goods. This has made state- and nation-building even more complicated and difficult.

Our contention against the argument of ‘more war’ theorists is that if war was the only solution to Afghanistan’s problems, then why has constant war-making by Afghan groups and foreign power failed to achieve piece? Under their convoluted logic, war and other elements of strategy, including state-building, either lacked focus or resources; and that it is not that the US-led occupation was morally or tactically wrong, it simply lost focus because of the Iraq war.

That is a plausible but questionable proposition. With the declaration of ‘victory’ in Iraq, and the trumpeting of the line that Iraq is now on strong political foundations, more troops are being proposed for Afghanistan. Will this fresh surge of thirty thousand troops work in a theatre where all kinds of weapons and forces have failed?

It is doubtful if more of the same will work in Afghanistan, or if war is the only way out. Why this blunt opposition against the conventional wisdom on Afghanistan?

Given the fierce hate and war passion, the US-led coalition, the stronger side, can damage the Afghan population and, to some extent, the insurgent forces, but cannot totally defeat them. Also, victory in such complex wars is ephemeral, uncertain and doubtable, as the other side retains the ability to regroup and re-emerge.

This has been the historical pattern of conflict in Afghanistan; and four cycles and thirty years are more than enough to learn from it. Unfortunately, no foreign power has learned lesson from Afghanistan, and also does not have the capacity to learn because of a distorted vision of Afghan society and the nature of the opponent.

Three decades of conflict have hardened Afghan groups, putting them in a better position than foreign occupants that call for state- and nation-building. Even if one does not doubt the intentions of foreign forces, and concedes that they are on a ‘friendly’ mission, ‘selflessly’ helping the Afghans, they have not been able to convince the common Afghan, especially the Pashtuns.

It is not just fear of the local Taliban and other groups, but rather a historical mix of religion and nationalism that keeps the resistance going. Creating and popularising myths in war are just as important as fighting the war. Here, the myth (to some, reality) is that the insurgents are a real power with organic social links in society, and are fighting for a cause: liberation of their country, once again, from foreign occupation. This myth is strengthened by the presence of torture cells and the collateral damage inflicted by foreign forces.

What is the way out?

It is necessary to make these counterpoints known at a time when so many ‘experts’ are involved in reviewing the Afghan war and advising the Obama administration on how best to fight and win the war. Two things are important, not for war, but for securing peace: national reconciliation within Afghanistan by bringing the Taliban into the political process; and promoting a regional approach to settling issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between Pakistan and India.

Building peace is harder than fighting wars. Until we take the difficult road to peace, the usual cycle of war in Afghanistan will continue, and the objective of peace and security in Afghanistan and the region will remain distant.